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NOTES 
THE LONG AND WINDING ROAD: REDISTRICTING IN 
LIGHT OF Shaw v. Reno 
INTRODUCTION 
The county manager takes a deep breath and removes the lat-
est census figures from his desk drawer. He turns op the com-
puter and begins to input the census data into the specialized 
program containing the geographical contours of his county, 
including township lines and neighborhood descriptions. The pro-
gram also contains instructions designed to bring any districts 
into compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (hereinafter 
"the VRA").l The VRA covers his county, along with forty other 
counties in North Carolina.2 Under the VRA, the United States 
Attorney General must pre approve (pre-clear) the redistricting 
plan for the election of county commissioners, as well as any other 
electoral changes, prior to the plan's implementation.3 
The census figures ..trouble the county manager because they 
indicate that forty-five percent of the county's citizens are mem-
bers of a minority group, and the enclaves of minority voters are 
widely dispersed throughout the county. Because the measure of 
discriminatory dilution is no longer whether a discriminatory 
motive exists in the minds of the redistricting body but solely 
whether a discriminatory impact is felt by a protected minority 
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb-1 (1988). 
2. Section Five of the VRA establishes the criteria for determining which 
jurisdictions are covered by the Act. The covered jurisdictions are listed in 28 
C.F.R. § 51 (1991). , 
3. Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988). Approval of 
changes in election districts actually occurs at the level of the Assistant Attorney 
General for the Civil Rights Division. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2818 (1993). 
An alternative mechanism for approval of the redistricting plan is to apply to the 
District Court for the District of Columbia for injunctive relief against 
enforcement of the act by federal officers. 42 U.S.C. § 19731(b) (1988). 
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group,4 he must be especially careful not to dilute minority voting 
strength, which would ensure disapproval by the Attorney Gen-
eral. While adding line after line of computer code to his program, 
the county manager must also address "one man, one vote" consid-
erations which require voting districts to be roughly equal in size.5 
Only after negotiating all the population and vote . dilution 
obstacles will he face the most formidable hurdle; approval of the 
redistricting plan by the county commissioners. The county com-
missioners are a contentious bunch who can find true agreement 
on only one subject, their desire to retain their status as commu-
nity leaders. They also happen to be his collective boss. 
As the deadline for completion of the redistricting project 
approaches, the county manager completes his input of census 
data, silently cursing his recent drive to encourage growth in the 
county which necessitated these districting changes. As the com-
puter begins digesting its diet of raw numbers, the county attor-
ney walks in the door. The county manager, already relieved th.at 
modern technology is attacking this complex redistricting prob-
lem, jauntily greets him. The smile on the county manager's face 
disappears as the attorney explains the latest Supreme Court 
decision on the subject, Shaw u. Reno. 6 His confidence is replaced 
with confusion. . 
The purpose of this note is to analyze the impact and scope of 
the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in Shaw u. 
Reno. This Note will attempt to recommend guidelines which will 
enable local government officials to negotiate the narrow and 
winding path between the standards of the VRA and the ambigu-
ous restrictions set by the Court's decision. 
THE CASE 
In the 1991 session, the North Carolina General Assembly 
approved a redistricting plan based on the results of the 1990 cen-
sus, resulting in twelve congressional districts.7 Due to 1';rorth 
Carolina's dramatic increase in population during the 1980's, the 
plan added another district to the eleven districts already in eXist-
ence.8 The plan included one majority-minority district in the 
4. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). For an explanation of vote 
dilution under the VRA, see infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. 
5. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
6. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). 
7. [d . at 2819. 
8. [d. at 2820. 
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northeast corner of the state, the first ever in North Carolina.9 
Because the VRA covered some of the counties involved, the plan 
was submitted to the United States Attorney General for pre-
clearance. 10 
The Assistant United States Attorney General for Civil 
Rights, acting on behalf of the Attorney General, formally objected 
to the plan, asserting that the General Assembly could have cre-
ated a second majority-minority district in the south-central to 
southeastern part of the state.11 In response to the failure of the 
redistricting plan to receive preapproval, the General Assembly 
revised the plan to create a second majority-minority district. 12 
The General Assembly reconfigured the First Congressional 
District, primarily located in northeastern North Carolina, and 
created the Twelfth Congressional District in the industrial/urban 
Piedmont stretching along the 1-85 corridor from east of Durham 
to Gastonia. 13 Descriptions of Districts One and Twelve have 
been numerous and none have been particularly flattering. 14 
The plan was subjected to immediate legal attack on several 
fronts. In Pope v. Blue,15 the Republican party of North Carolina 
launched the first assault, objecting to the plan as an unconstitu-
tional "political gerrymander."16 Under the analysis developed in 
Davis v. Bandemer, l7 a federal three-judge district court dis-
9. [d. 
10. [d. at 2818. 
11. [d. 
12. [d . (citing 1991 N.C. Extra Sess. Laws, Chap. 7 (1991». 
13. See map infra at app. 
14. District One stretches from the North Carolina-Virginia border southward 
nearly to the South Carolina border. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2820 (1993). 
It tapers from a large cohesive unit in the northeast to a thin band in the south. 
[d . Along the way fingerlike projections protrude in several places. [d. This 
district has been described as resembling "a bug splattered on a windshield," id. 
(quoting Political Pornography - II, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1992, at A14), and a 
"Rorschach ink-blot test," Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 475 (E.D.N.C. 1992) 
(Voorhees, C.J. , concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
District Twelve is the more objectionable ofthe two districts. As it meanders 
along the 1-85 corridor, District Twelve expands to swallow up predominantly 
minority precincts from Durham to Gastonia. Shaw , 113 S. Ct. at 2820. The 
result has been described as "serpentine," Shaw ,808 F. Supp. at 476 (Voorhees, 
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) and "snake-like," Shaw, 113 S. 
Ct. at 2820. See map infra at app. 
15. 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C. 1992). 
16. [d. at '395. 
17. 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (plurality opinion). 
3
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missed this suit for failure to state a claim for which relief could 
be granted. 18 
Davis established a two-prong test for determining whether a 
complaint is sufficient to allege an unconstitutional "political ger-
rymander."19 The first prong requires an allegation of "inten-
tional discrimination against an identifiable political groUp."20 
The district court found this element present in the multiple alle-
gations that a Democratic-controlled legislature made the redis-
tricting plan.21 
The claim failed, however, on the issue of "an actual discrimi-
natory effect on [the identifiable political] group," the second 
prong of the Davis test.22 The complaint did not allege that the 
Republican Party had been removed from the political process 
entirely.23 The Supreme Court summarily affirmed this decision.24 
Private residents of Durham also made an attack on the 
redistricting plan in Shaw v. Barr .25 Because the plan split Dur-
ham County into two congressional districts, the plaintiffs claimed 
the plan constituted an unconstitutional "racial gerrymander" 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.26 In a 2-to-1 decision, another federal three-judge district 
court dismissed this action, like Pope, on a 12(b)(6) motion for fail-
ure to state a claim.27 
Districts Two and Twelve met with no objections from the 
United States Attorney General's office.28 The action of the Attor-
ney General in pre approving the General Assembly's revised 
redistricting plan was challenged in Shaw as well, but the district 
court dismissed the claim which asked for an injunction to prevent 
18. Pope, 809 F. Supp. at 397. 
19. Davis, 478 U.S at 127. 
20. [d . 
21. Pope, 809 F. Supp at 396. 
22. [d. 
23. [d . at 397. 
24. Pope v. Blue, 113 S. Ct. 30 (1992). 
25. 808 F . Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C. 1992). 
26. [d. at 469. 
27. [d . at 473. The majority opinion ofthe district court relied upon Supreme 
Court precedent in United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 
U.S. 144 (1977). Shaw, 808 F.Supp. at 470. For a discussion of this case, see infra 
text accompanying notes 80-104. Chief Judge Richard Voorhees concurred with 
most of the majority opinion but dissented on the crucial issue of whether a cause 
of action had been asserted under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. [d. at 480. 
28. Shaw, 808 F. Supp. at 467. 
1994] 
29. [d . 
30. [d . I 
31. [d. 
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enforcement of the VRA by the Attorney General. 29 The rationale 
used by the lower court in dismissing the claim against the Attor-
ney General, left undisturbed by the Supreme Court, was a lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.30 All three district court judges 
agreed Section 14(b) of the VRA vested exclusive jurisdiction over 
claims against the Attorney General's office in the District Court 
for the District ofColumbia.31 This provision applies regardless of 
the plaintiffs' attempt to construe his action as an effort to secure 
a declaratory judgment rather than an attack on Section Five 
enforcement.32 
Two of the judges further determined dismissal appropriate 
because the action against the Attorney General involved a chal-
lenge to the discretionary power given the Attorney General under 
Section Five of the VRA.33 This type of action also failed to state a 
claim because such a challenge is not subject to judicial review.34 
The Supreme Court35 noted jurisdiction over the Equal Pro-
tection issue.36 The Court reversed the district court's decision; 
the complaint stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause 
by alleging the redistricting scheme was so irrational on its face 
that it could only be understood as an effort to segregate voters on 
the basis of race.37 
BACKGROUND 
A. The Voting Rights 4 ct of 1965 
The VRA is the legislative mechanism which gave actual 
enfranchisement to minority voters and brought to fruition the 
ideals originally expressed in the post-Civil War amendments to 
29. [d. at 466. 
30. [d. (citing Morris v. Gresette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977)). 
31. [d . The Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 14(b), 42 U.S.C. 19731(b) (1988), 
states: "[N]o court other than the District Court for the District of Columbia .. . 
shall have jurisdiction to issue any . . . restraining order or temporary or 
permanent injunction against the execution or enforcement of [Section 5 of the 
VRA] or any action of any Federal officer or employee pursuant thereto.» [d. 
32. Shaw , 808 F. Supp. at 466. 
33. [d. at 467. 
34. [d. (citing Morris, 432 U.S. at 506). 
35. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals did not review the decision as the 
VRA provides direct appeal to the Supreme Court. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(3)(g) (1988). 
36. Shaw v. Barr, 113 S. Ct. 653 (1992). Defendant's name was changed to 
Reno to reflect the appointment of Janet Reno as U.S. Attorney General. 
37. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). 
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the Constitution.38 The Act prescribed strong medicine to remedy 
the "insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated ... 
through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution" 
by white majorities in the South.39 
The teeth of the VRA originally resided solely in Section 
Five.40 Section Five requires that any jurisdiction covered by the 
VRA 41 which adopts new voting "practice[s] or procedure[s]" to 
have the new procedure preapproved as nondiscriminatory.42 The 
jurisdiction may obtain this preapproval, prior to implementation, 
either by a declaratory judgment of the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia or by administrative approval ("pre~clearance") 
of the Attorney General. 43 The Supreme Court upheld this drastic 
provision as constitutional in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.44 
Following Katzenbach, the majority of litigation surrounding 
the VRA has focused on the appropriate standard of review in 
determining whether a new voting "practice or procedure" violates 
the VRA.45 The standard applied by the District Court for the Dis~' 
trict of Columbia or the United States Attorney General in deter-
38. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIV and XV. 
39. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966) (upholding the 
constitutionality of the VRA). 
40. 79 Stat. 439 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988)). 
41. Covered jurisdictions are defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1988), as those 
jurisdictions which had in place ari'y voting test and in which less than fifty 
percent of the voting age population was registered to vote (or had actually voted 
in the 1972 presidential election) as of November 1, 1972. See 28 C.F.R. § 51 
(1991), for the complete list of covered jurisdictions as determined by the Justice 
Department; see also Robert Bryson Carter, Note, Mere Voting: Etowah County 
Commission and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 71 N.C. L. REV. 569, 572 n.38 
(1993). 
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1988). 
43. Id. at § 1973c. The statute further requires that the declaratory judgment 
be made by a three-judge panel and that "any appeal shall lie to the Supreme 
Court." Id . There has been a substantial amount oflitigation on the question of 
which changes constitute a "practice or procedure" under the VRA. Becaus.e 
redistricting clearly falls into this category, the controversy is beyond the scope 
of this note. For a discussion of this issue, see Carter, supra note 41. 
44. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). The Court allowed the apparent violation of the 
Tenth Amendment because "[t]he gist of the matter is that the Fifteenth 
Amendment supersedes contrary exertions of state power." Id. at 325. 
45. See, e.g., Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992); Beer v. 
United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976); Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 
544 (1969); see also Carter, supra note 41. 
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mining whether a state voting change is discriminatory under 
Section Five is whether the state action is "non-retrogressive."46 
In 1982, Congress amended the VRA.47 The most prominent 
amended feature is the expansion of Section Two to all states, not 
just those covered by Section Five.48 Originally, Section Two pro-
vided that no state could make changes to voting practices or pro-
cedures with discriminatory intent as inferred from the "totality of 
the circumstances."49 With the amendment, the standard for 
judging a violation of the Act under Section Two became one of 
"discriminatory effect" rather than "discriminatory intent."5o 
Thornburg v. Gingles 51 established Section Two's prohibited 
discrIminatory effect as vote dilution, the impairment of the "abil-
ity of a protected class to elect its candidate of choice on an equal 
basis with other voters."52 The Thornburg test for determining if 
vote dilution has occurred consists of three elements: 1) "that [the 
protected class] is sufficiently large 'and geographically compact to 
constitute a majority in a single-member district"; 2) "that it is 
politically cohesive" and 3) "that the white majority votes suffi-
46. Beer, 425 U.S. at 141. Under Beer, a state may not gain preclearance 
under Section Five if the change in voting procedure will result in "a 
retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective 
exercise" of the right to vote. Id. "Retrogression" is defined in WEBSTER'S NEW 
UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1549 (2d ed. 1983), as "the act of going 
backward." In the context of voting rights, retrogression connotes a reversal of 
progress on voting equality by reduction in the participation of minorities in the 
electoral process. 
47. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988» . 
48. Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had 
Said: "When It Comes To Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything, It's the Only 
Thing"?, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1237, 1238-39 (1993). 
49. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769 (1973); see also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 
U.S. 613 (1982). The specific language in the original Section Two was that "[n]o 
voting qualification ... shall be imposed by any State . .. to deny or abridge the 
right of any citizen ... to vote on account of race." Grofman, supra note 48, at 
1239 n.6 (emphasis added). The test under the original Section Two was located 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). 
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988). The amended Section Two provides that "[n]o 
voting qualification . .. shall be imposed by any State . . . in a manner which 
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen . .. to vote on account 
of race." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1988) (emphasis added). 
51. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
52. Id. at 47. Thornburg, another North Carolina case, concerned multi-
member voting districts. Id . at 32. 
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ciently as a bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the minority's 
preferred candidate."53 
Thus the VRA requires states, including North Carolina, who 
are covered by Section Five, to comply both with Section Five, by 
preclearing any change in voting procedures and meeting the 
standard of "non-retrogression", and Section Two, by satisfying 
the Thornburg vote dilution test. However, compliance with all 
the Sections of the VRA is not sufficient to immunize a voting pro-
cedure from challenge, as independent constitutional challenges 
may exist under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.54 
B. Constitutional Challenges to Legislative Districting 
1. Gomillion v. Lightfoot 
In Gomillion v. Lightfoot,55 black voters in Tuskegee, Ala-
bama alleged the state of Alabama discriminated against them in 
violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and denied them the right to vote in con-
travention of the Fifteenth Amendment.56 This discrimination 
occurred in 1957 when the Alabama Legislature passed LocalAct 
140, redrawing the boundaries of the municipality of Tuskegee.57 
Local Act 140 altered Tuskegee's boundaries "from a square to 
an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure."58 Justice Frankfurter, 
writing for the Court, found this reconfiguration to exclude all but 
"four or five of its 400" ..black voters while excluding none of the 
white voters. 59 The only rational conclusion which could be 
53. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50-51. Explaining application of this test to 
single-member districts, Justice Scalia reasons that a "geographically compact 
minority," "minority political cohesion," and "majority bloc voting" must be 
established or there "neither has been a wrong nor can [there] be a remedy." 
Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1091 (1993) (quoting Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 
50-51); see also Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993). 
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (providing that pre-clearance or declaratory 
judgment does not bar subsequent suit); Allen v. Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 
544, 549 (1969) ("private parties may enjoin the enforcement of the new 
enactment . . . in traditional suits attacking its constitutionality"). A direct 
attack on the constitutionality of the voting procedure, as opposed to an attack 
under the VRA, was the basis of the suit in Shaw v. Reno. See supra note 26 and 
accompanying text. 
55. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
56. [d. at 340. 
57. [d. 
58. [d . . 
59. [d. at 341. 
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reached was that Local Act 140 was solely designed for "fencing-
out" black voters from the city of Tuskegee, thereby depriving 
them of their municipal vote.60 
In response to the plaintiffs' allegations, the state asserted 
that Supreme Court precedent established that municipal power 
was unlimited regarding its boundaries.61 Therefore, the Court 
could not overrule Local Act 140.62 Justice Frankfurter answered 
that "[l]egislative control of municipalities, no less than other 
state power, lies within the scope of relevant limitations imposed 
by the United States Constitution."63 . The Court found that Local 
Act 140 violated the Fifteenth Amendment without mentioning 
the alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations. 64 
In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Whittaker deter-
mined Local Act 140 was a violation, not of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, but of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.65 He found troubling the fact the right to vote had 
not actually been taken away but merely shifted to a new political 
subdivision.66 In his opinion, the violation was that described in 
Brown u. Board of Education 67 and Cooper u. Aaron ,68 an "unlaw-
ful segregation."69 The rationale and grounds for Justice Whitta-
ker's concurrence proved to be more persuasive than the rationale 
of the majority (opinion. Subsequent cases evaluated alleged racial 
gerrymanders primarily under the Equal Protection Clause.7o 
60. Id. 
61. Id . 
62. Id. at 343. The state relied upon Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 
(1907) (holding that the unlimited power of a municipality to consolidate with 
another city did not give rise to Due Process violations with regard to tax 
increases resulting from the merger). Id. 
63. Gomillion , 364 U.S. at 344-45. "It has long been recognized in cases which 
have prohibited a State from exploiting a power acknowledged to be absolute in 
an isolated context to justify the imposition of an 'unconstitutional condition.' " 
Id. at 346. 
64. Id. at 347. 
65. Id . at 349 (Whittaker, J. , concurring). 
66.Id. 
67. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
68. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
69. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring). 
70. See infra notes 71-104 and accompanying text. Though violations of the 
Fourteenth Amendment constitute the primary grounds for redistricting 
challenges since Gomillion, plaintiffs still allege Fifteenth Amendment violations 
(as well as a plethora of other violations under the VRA) which are generally 
ignored by the Court. See, e.g., United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. 
Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964). 
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2. Wright v. Rockefeller 
Challenges to congressional redistricting plans were first 
addressed in Wright v. Rockefeller.71 In 1961, New York reappor-
tioned the congressional districts on Manhattan Island to create 
one majority non-white district and three majority white dis-
tricts.72 Minority voters objected to the districting plan; they con-
tended the lines drawn by the New York Legislature were 
motivated by considerations of race in segregating an area with a 
high percentage of non-white voters into three districts.73 This 
configuration gave minority voters a majority in only one district 
and created one overwhelmingly white district.74 
The majority opinion, written by Justice Black, recognized the 
possibility that the congressional district lines had been drawn for 
racial reasons but accepted the three-judge district court's assess-
ment of the plaintiffs' failure to meet their burden of proof.1~ , 
Implicitly, the .decision reflects congressional districts drawn 
along racial lines present a constitutionally suspect action. 76 
Unlike the majority opinion, Justice Douglas' dissent did not: 
concern the failure to meet the burden of proof.17 Instead, he 
found the "zigzag, tortuous lines" drawn to create the majority 
white district were only explainable "in racial terms."78 Based on 
the character of the district lines . and other facts determined by 
the district court, he concluded the districting plan segregated 
Manhattan racially and "[r]acial segregation that is state-spon-
sored should be nullified whatever may have been intended."79 
From the standpoint of precedent, Wright is important 
because it recognized that state action regarding federal congres-
sional districts is susceptible to a challenge alleging the unconsti-
tutional segregation of voters by race. From the standpoint of 
legal theory, Justice Douglas' eloquent dissent forms the founda-
tion for Shaw v. Reno. 
71. 376 U.S. 52 (1964). 
72. Id . at 53. The non-white majority districts consisted of black voters ana 
voters of Puerto Rican origin. Id. at 54. 
73. Id. at 54. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 58. 
76. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2826 (1993) (interpreting Wright). 
77. Wright, 376 U.S. at 59 (Douglas, J ., dissenting). 
78. Id. 
79. Id . at 61. The most salient fact in Justice Douglas' factual determination 
of segregation was that white voters constituted 94.9% in the majority white 
districts-indicating a near total segregation. See id . at 59. 
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3. United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey 
United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey,80 [here-
inafter "UJO"] was the first case to address whether "the use of 
racial criteria ... in [an] attempt to comply with Section Five of 
the [VRA] and to secure the .approval of the Attorney General vio-
lated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment."81 The collision 
between the extreme remedy of the VRA and the Constitution 
gave rise to a "highly fractured decision."82 The VRA explicitly 
requires consideration of the effect of a voting procedure change 
on racial minority groups. 83 Yet, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments forbid differentiation on account of race.84 
Section Five of the VRA covered King's County in New York.85 
The Attorney General rejected the initial reapportionment plan 
for this county because New York failed to show the plan did not 
abridge the right to vote on account of race. 86 The N ew York legis-
lature adopted a revised reapportionment plan which addressed 
the Attorney General's concerns.87 In the effort to obtain approval 
from the Attorney General; the plan effectively divided a commu-
nity of Hasidic Jews into two districts.88 Subsequently, the Attor-
ney General approved the plan.89 The community of Hasidic Jews 
challenged the revised plan.90 Their complaint alleged the value 
of their votes was diluted solely for the purpose of achieving a 
80. 430 U.S. 144 (1977). 
81. Id. at 147. 
82. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2829 (1993). UJO gave rise to three 
separate opinions and one concurrence in part without opinion; Justice Marshall 
did not take part in the case. UJO, 430 U.S. at 147. 
83. See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text. 
84. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ:, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) {Harlan, J ., dissenting). But see Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); United States v. 
Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969). These cases, and others 
like them, hold that race-conscious remedies are not always forbidden by the 
Constitution. UJO, 430 U.S. at 170 (Brennan, J., concurring in part). 
85. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of what 
"coverage" by the VRA entails. 
86. UJO, 430 U.S. at 150. See supra notes 38-54 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the requirements of the VRA. 
87. UJO, 430 U.S. at 150-51. 
88. Id . 
89. Id. at 151-52. 
90. Id. at 152. 
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racial quota of sixty-five percent non-white population in a dis-
puted New York Assembly district.91 
The plurality opinion, written by Justice White,92 reached 
several conclusions based on Supreme · Court precedent. Relying 
on two prior VRA cases, Beer v. United States 93 and City of Rich-
mond v. United States, 94 the Justice determined the implementa-
tion of quotas is not per se unconstitutional and the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments do not mandate a per se rule against 
using race as a factor in redistricting.95 Because the plaintiffs did 
not show New York did any more than required by Section Five 
under the guidelines of Beer, the plurality found the plaintiffs 
could not challenge the application of quotas in this case.96 Jus-
tice White completed his analysis by maintaining that the plain-
tiffs suffered no constitutionally cognizable injury because New 
York's plan did not represent a "slur or stigma with respect to 
whites."97 An intentional reduction of white voting power is 
proper in order to recognize minority voting power under the 
remedial authority of the VRA.98 
91. Id. The 1974 plan counted as minority districts only those which had 
sixty-five percent or higher non-white pop).llation. Id. The New York Legislature 
believed a sixty-five percent figure was the minimum population figure allowed 
by the Justice Department. Id . 
92 . . Justice White was joined in full only by Justice Stevens. Id. at 147. 
93. 425 U.S. 130 (1976). This case upheld the "nonretrogression" principle 
which required that minority voting strength be enhanced in order to satisfy 
Section Five ofthe Voting Rights Act. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
94. 422 U.S. 358 (1975) (upholding the creation of minority districts which 
"fairly [reflect] the strength of the Negro community"). 
95. UJO, 430 U.S. at 161. Justice White specifically stated: "[I]mplicit in Beer 
and City of Richmond, then, is the proposition that the Constitution does not 
prevent a State subject to the Voting Rights Act from deliberately creating or 
preserving black majorities in particular districts in order to ensure its 
reapportionment plan complies with Section Five." Id. Justices Brennan and 
Blackmun concurred in this assessment. Id. at 168-69. 
96. Id. at 162-63. 
97. Id. at 165-66. Justice White based his thinking on political 
gerrymandering cases which held that no injury occurs merely because a vo~er's 
candidate loses an election. Id. at 166; see also, Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 
124, 153-60 (1971). Justice Rehnquist was the only concurring justice with this 
portion of the plurality opinion. UJO, 430 U.S. at 147. 
98. UJO, 430 U.S. at 168. Justice White continued: "[W]e think it 
[constitutionally] permissible for a State, employing sound districting principles 
such as compactness and population equality, to attempt to prevent racial 
minorities from ·being repeatedly outvoted by creating districts that will afford 
fair representation to the members of those racial groups who are sufficiently 
1994] 
A. 
103. 
104. 
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Justice Brennan was content to leave the "thorny question" 
answered by the last assertion in Justice White's opinion for 
another day but concurred in the result.99 Justice Stewart con-
curred separately by finding no violation of the Fourteenth or Fif-
teenth Amendments because there was no discriminatory purpose 
or effect on the part of the N ew York Legislature.loo 
Only Chief Justice Burger dissented from the judgment. lOl He 
asserted that racial quotas are per se unconstitutional under the 
rule established in Gomillion. 102 He further concluded the plural-
ity opinion misread both the VRA and the holding in Beer. 103 In 
his opinion, the decision "moves us one step farther away from a 
truly homogenous society."104 
Summation of the Court's decision in UJO is difficult in the 
extreme. The only clear principle is the use of racial considera-
tions is acceptable as an effort to comply with the VRA. The con-
stitutionally tolerable limits of this use of race were left undefined 
until Shaw v. Reno. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Justice O'Connor's Majority Opinion 
The binding precedent created by the majority decision in 
Shaw establishes the constitutionally tolerable limits to the broad 
scope of the VRA. The hol~ing provides: 
numerous and whose residential patterns afford the opportunity of creating 
districts in which they will be the majority." Id . (emphasis added). The 
emphasized language plays a large role in the majority decision in Shaw v. Reno, 
113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). 
99. UJO, 430 U.S. at 171. Justice Brennan was particularly concerned with 
the fact that the Court appeared to endorse a racial classification scheme under 
the misguided, unwise, and uncons~itutional notion of benign discrimination. Id . 
at 174-75. He concurred with the result, however, because the VRA, 
implemented by the Attorney General on districts which had previously operated 
under discriminatory voting procedures, "substantially minimizes the objections 
to preferential treatment" of minority voters. Id. at 175. Justice Stewart joined 
Justice Brennan's opinion but filed his own opinion as well. [d. at 16B. 
100. Id . at 179. Justice Powell joined Justice Stewart's opinion which relied 
solely on the fact the plan did not undervalue the votes of white vo~ers in King's 
County as a whole. Id . at 180. 
101. Id. at 180. 
102. Id . at 181; see also supra text accompanying notes 55-70. 
103. UJO, 430 U.S. at 183; see also supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
104. UJO , 430 U.S. at 187 . . 
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A plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal 
Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legisla-
tion, though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be under-
stood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into 
different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation 
lacks sufficient justification. 105 
In simpler terms, Shaw stands for the proposition that traditional 
Equal Protection Clause analysis will apply even when reappor-
tionment plans have been preapproved under the VRA, if those 
plans appear to segregate voters along racial lines. 106 
1. The Gateway to Strict Scrutiny 
Justice O'Connor carefully limited the holding to redistricting 
plans which "rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segre-
gate the races for the purposes of voting."107 In her view, the 
claim put forth by those challenging the redistricting plan was 
analytically distinct from prior "vote dilution" decisions. lOB Most 
importantly, this claim was analytically distinct from that made 
in UJO, the case relied upon by the district court below in grant-
ing summary judgment.l09 Here, North Carolina's redistricting 
plan was constitutionally suspect because the new districts were 
shaped in such a grotesque fashion to raise the eyebrows of the 
Court as being potentially "unexplainable on grounds other than 
race."110 
Illogical appearance or-the legislative districts created by a 
challenged reapportionment plan is the threshold requirement 
plaintiffs' must meet in order to reach the fertile field of "strict 
scrutiny." Once the plaintiff establishes the plan can only be 
explainable as racial segregation, the State must show a "compel-
ling interest" and a "narrowly tailored" statute. 111 
105. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2828 (1993). 
106. Id . "State legislation that expressly distinguishes among citizens because 
of their race [must] be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental 
interest." Id. at 2824. In analysis under the Equal Protection Clause, it is well 
established that use of raqial classification gives rise to "strict scrutiny." Sef!, 
e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of 
Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
107. Id. at 2824. 
108. Id. at 2829. 
109. Id . 
110. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 
(1977); see also Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825. 
111. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832. 
1994] 
14
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss3/3
[Vol. 16:457 
ler the Equal 
t the legisla-
lOt be under-
:l voters into 
le separation 
hat traditional 
when reappor-
VRA, if those 
106 
to redistricting 
effort to segre-
her view, the 
cting plan was 
isions.108 Most 
rom that made 
below in grant-
l'S redistricting 
, districts were 
!yebrows of the 
nds other than 
~s created by a 
ld requirement 
~ field of "strict 
ln can only be 
:how a "compel-
ng citizens because 
!ling governmental 
n Clause, it is well 
~ict scrutiny." See, 
lt v. Jackson Bd. of 
429 U.S. 252, 266 
1994] SHAW V. R ENO 471 
The rationale for this requirement lies in the pre-VRA cases 
of Gomillion and Wright .112 Justice O'Connor found Gomillion 
established that district lines w:hich were "obviously drawn for the 
purpose of separating voters by race" demanded strict scrutiny 
regardless of the underlying motivation. 113 She further found 
Wright to stand for the proposition that where voters of the same 
race reside in close proximity, the motivations of compactness, 
contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions would be ade-
quate to explain the districts on grounds other than race. 114 
Clouding the issue is the Supreme Court's acknowledgement 
that not all race-conscious decisionmaking is unconstitutional. 115 
Apparently, the question becomes one of degree rather than a 
brightline rule that race conscious decisionmaking in the realm of 
redistricting is per se unconstitutional. The greater the influence 
of race in the state decisionmaking process, the more likely the 
chance that impermissible racial stereotyping will occur116 and 
the more likely that representatives will view theb.selves as rep-
resentatives of one race rather than representatives for all the 
voters in their district. 117 
The Court gives little or no guidance as to what constitutes a 
district which is "explairiable only in terms of race."118 They pre-
fer, instead, to imply only that they will know it when they see 
itY9 Under the facts of this case, an allegation of racial motiva-
tion combined with a map is sufficient to raise the issue, and, upon 
remand, North Carolina has .the task of explaining the district in 
112. See supra text accompanying notes 55-79. 
113. Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at 2825. 
114. Id. at 2826. 
115. Id . at 2824. 
116. Id. at 2827. 
117. Id; see also Houston v. Lafayette County, No. 3:91CVI08-D-D, 1993 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 18467, at *37-40 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 3, 1993) (discussing the 
detrimental impact of "safe" minority-majority seats on the representation of the 
minority community). 
118. Shaw, 113 S. Ct . at 2826. For an excellent discussion of possible objective 
standards which could be applied in deterrn.ining which districts violate the 
Shaw holding, see Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, 
"Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances 
After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993) (advocating use of computer-
generated compactness criteria to analyze the allowable deviance from the 
normal range). 
119. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827. The Court apologetically falls back on 
Justice Stevens' derivation of Justice Stewart's famous definition of obscenity in 
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 755 (1983). Id. 
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non-racial terms.120 Any attempt to justify creation of the offen-
sive congressional districts in other than racial terms will likely 
fall on deaf ears on remand; in a strikingly similar case arising in 
Louisiana and delayed pending the outcome of Shaw, the district 
court flatly rejected all proffered justifications by the state as obvi-
ously pretextual.121 
2. Strict Scrutiny Applied 
Once the State fails to explain a redistricting scheme in non-
racial terms, the State must show a "compelling state interest" in 
the creation of majority-minority districts.122 Noting a redistrict-
ing plan which is approved under Section Five of the VRA may 
still be held unconstitutional, 123 Justice O'Connor agreed that 
compliance with Section Five constituted a "compelling state 
interest."124 
The Court also recognized the state could have a "compelling 
state interest" in complying with Section Two of the VRA.125 
Outside of the VRA, the State could assert a "compelling state 
interest" in eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination.126 
In Shaw, none of these "compelling state interests" were devel-
oped in the district court, therefore, the questions are to be inves-
tigated on remand. 127 
The Court gave no specific guidelines regarding sufficiency of 
these potentially compelling interests. Justice O'Connor's discus-
sion of the facts in Sha w raises more issues and answers less 
questions. Judging from the tenor of her opinion, the Court will 
strictly scrutinize challenged redistricting schemes, especially 
120. [d. at 2832. In this regard, North Carolina has primarily two options. 
The first is to redraw the legislative districts, thereby mooting the question. The 
second will be to argue that the district is an attempt to create a predominantly 
urban district and thus was not solely a race-based plan. 
121. Hays v. Louisiana, No. 92-CV-1522, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18775, at *35-
45 (W.D. La. Dec. 28, 1993). 
122. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2830. 
123. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
124. [d. at 2830. But see Hays, 1993 U.S. Dist. 18775, at *52 (assuming 
without deciding that compliance with Section Five is a compelling state interest 
but expressing doubts on the matter). 
125. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2831; For an explanation of Section Two, see supra 
notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 
126. Shaw , 113 S. Ct. at 2831; see also Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.s. 469, 
490-92 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279-82 (1986). 
127. 113 S. Ct. at 2831. 
B. 
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with regards to compliance with either Section Two or Section 
Five of the VRA. 128 
Even if a compelling state interest exists, the plan could only 
be upheld if it was "narrowly tailored" to achieve that permissible 
interest. 129 Under this prong of the strict scrutiny test, the state 
must show it did no more than was necessary to prevent "non-
retrogression."13o 
B. Dissenting Opinions 
1. Justice White's Dissent 
Justice White, raising the most pressing question left unan-
swered by the majority opinion writes, "[S]imply stated: the 
appellants have not presented a cognizable claim, because they 
have not alleged a cognizable injury."131 The plaintiffs must 
allege either deprivation outright of the right to vote or reduction 
in a political or racial group's influence on the political process. 132 
His rationale is that it is not possible to extricate political and 
racial considerations from the redistricting process.133 Therefore, 
a clear injury must occur before the courts enter the byzantine 
world of legislative redistricting.134 Justice O'Connor failed to 
address this "cognizable injury" question. 
Justice White also objects strenuously to the majority utiliz-
ing bizarrely shaped districts as the criterion for applying strict 
scrutiny because strangely shaped legislative districts are not, in 
and of themselves, clearly indicative of unconstitutional racial 
128. See, e.g., Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824-32; see also Hays, 1993 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 18775, at *52-64. . 
129. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2831. 
130. [d . Because North Carolina had no majority-minority congressional 
districts prior to the redistricting and two afterwards, it was implied the General 
Assembly went far beyond the requirements of "non-retrogression." [d.; see also 
Hays, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18775, at *56. For a discussion of "non-
retrogression," see supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
131. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting). 
132. [d. (citing Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); White v. Regester, 
412 U.S. 755 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1974); Mobile v. Bolden, 
446 U.S. 55 (1980)). 
133. See id. at 2834-35. 
134. [d . Indeed, it has been suggested that even judicial decisions on the 
matter of redistricting are infused with partisan political concerns. Grofman, 
supra note 48, at 1249-56. These concerns center upon a predominantly 
Republican bench and previously Republican Department of .Justice showing 
great favor to minority voting rights. [d . 
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gerrymandering.135 His theory relies on the assertion that the 
Constitution is concerned with the effects of racial segregation and 
not merely the unsightly appearance of such segregation. The 
majority's discussion of the effects of "political apartheid" as being 
an impermissible form of racial stereotyping which thereby brings 
about unconstitutional effects is very persuasive in answer to Jus-
tice White's argument. 136 
2. Justice Stevens' Dissent 
Justice Stevens' dissent focuses on his assertion that a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause may occur when a group in 
power uses this power solely to enhance its political strength. 137 
His theory applies to all types of group classifications including 
racial, political, and ethnic.138 According to the majority opinion, 
Justice Steven's approach is fatally flawed because racial classifi-
cations, by the language of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments, are subject to a higher level of scrutiny under the 
Constitution and are suspect regardless of which race is 
benefitted. 139 
3. Justice Souter's Dissent 
Justice Souter's dissent is based upon the same principles as 
Justice White's dissent, namely that injury in the form of vote 
dilution must be shown before a redistricting plan may be ruled 
unconstitutional,140 According.. to Justice Souter's theory, by 
drawing district lines to favor minority voters, majority voters 
have had no constitutional rights infringed upon because the~r 
opportunities to participate in the process have not been dimin-
ished. 141 Because there is no infringement of a constitutional 
right due to gerrymandering, these challenges should be consid-
ered in a category distinct from traditional Equal Protection anal-
ysis and subject to a lesser degree of scrutiny than strict. 142 
135. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2840. "Given two districts drawn on similar, race-
based grounds, the one does not become more injurious than the other simply by 
virtue of being snake-like, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned and 
absent any evidence of differential racial impact." [d. at 2841. 
136. See id . at 2827. 
137. [d. at 2844. 
138. [d. 
139. [d . at 2829. 
140. [d. at 2846. 
141. [d. 
142. [d . at 2846-48. 
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Justice O'Connor answers this attack by responding that racial 
classifications which separate voters into racial blocs create "spe-
cial harms that are not present in our vote dilution cases," such as 
enhancing racial stereotypes and encouraging elected officials to 
represent only one race rather than all their constituents. 143 
These "harms" necessitate a stricter scrutiny of the purpose and 
means used by the State.144 
4. Net Result of the Dissenting Opinions 
In analyzing most Supreme Court decisions, it is helpful to 
interpret the dissenting opinions which try to modify or moderate 
the impact of the majority opinion. However, this approach is 
unhelpful in Shaw because each of the dissenters objects force-
fully to the main tenet of the majority opinion - a constitutional 
claim arises from egregious drawing of district lines which are 
explainable only by reference to race. 
Even so, Justice O'Connor's failure to address the suggestions 
of Justices White and Souter that no cognizable injury occurred 
may signal a limitation on the holding. This limitation arguably 
is the districts must be so incredibly bizarre (e.g. North Carolina's 
Twelfth District) to draw the absolutely unavoidable conclusion 
that impermissible racial stereotyping occurred.145 
c. Recommendations for Local Redistricting Officials 
The substantial ifupact of Shaw is already beginning to 
appear. In a case decided just seventeen days after the Shaw 
opinion, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals used the decision to 
reject a racially motivated town council plan in Hines v. Mayor of 
Ahoskie .146 In Hines, the court of appeals upheld the district 
court in rejecting an alternative redistricting plan for the town of 
Ahoskie, North Carolina.147 The original plan provided for two 
black majority town council districts and two white majority town 
council districts with a fifth council member elected at-Iarge.148 
This plan had received pre-clearance from the Attorney General 
under Section Five of the VRA but was objected to by black towns-
people who contended that an alternative plan with three majority 
143. [d. at 2828. 
144. [d. 
145. See, e.g., id. at 2848 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
146. No. 92-2590, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 17587, at *24 (4th Cir. July 15,1993). 
147. [d. at *2. 
148. [d. at *4. 
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black districts and two majority white districts should be cre-
ated. 149 The town has 50.5% black population but only 45.6% 
black voting-age population.150 The district court found that crea-
tion of three majority black districts would overrepresent the 
black population but that based on past voting patterns the at-
large district would effectively overrepresent the white popula-
tion.151 The district court solved the dilemma by eliminating the 
at-large district leaving only four town council districts.152 
The court of appeals, after reinstating the original plan, 
upheld the district court's rejection of the three black district 
alternative plan by asserting Shaw stood for the proposition that 
when the only motivation for a districting plan is racial and no 
sufficient justification exists, the plan violates the equal protection 
rights of white voters.153 Though this is probably too broad a read-
ing of the holding in Shaw, it is indicative of the rapid and violent 
impact of the case.154 As Hines indicates, the Shaw decision will 
have a bearing on districting for local elections which is immedi-
ate and drastic. 155 
First Recommendation: Continued Compliance 
It is important for local officials to ensure compliance with the 
VRA as applied to their particular counties. Forty counties in 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at *2. 
151. Id. at *7. 
152. Id. at *7-9. 
153. Id. at *23. 
154. See, e.g., Peter Applebome, N. C. Case Stirs Up Other Legal Challenges to 
Redistricting, THE NEWS AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 27, 1994, at 19A. 
'l'his article focuses on the veritable explosion of redistricting litigation following 
Shaw. Id. The primary focus of the redistricting challenges is congressional 
districts but local election districts, especially in hotly contested political regions, 
are also among the targets. Id. 
155. The effect will be long-lasting as well. The majority opinion, written by 
Justice O'Connor, was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, Justice 
Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2819 (1993). The 
core of the majority, therefore, consists of relatively young Justices who, in all 
probability, will influence the Court for a long time. 
The dissenters, in contrast, consist of Justice White (submitting this opinion 
on his last day on the Court), Justice Blackmun (who recently announced his 
retirement), Justice Stevens (age 73), and Justice Souter (the only dissenter 
appointed later than 1975 and under 70 years old). . 
It is not yet' possible to assess the impact that the appointment of Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg will have on the principles established in Shaw. 
1994] 
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North Carolina must comply with Section Five of the VRA.156 The 
principle of "non-retrogression" still applies in those counties; 
therefore, minority voters must not lose electoral strength under 
any new districting plan.157 
Section Two of the VRA applies to all counties.158 It is neces-
sary, therefore, to satisfy the Thornburg v. Gingles test for vote 
dilution as well. 159 The requirement of continued compliance 
results in there being no shortcut around the Shaw holding by 
creating completely at-large or multi-member districts. 
Recommendation: Traditional Redistricting Principles 
The specific holding in Shaw applying strict scrutiny to voting 
districts will come into play only if the districts drawn can be 
explained solely in racial terms. 160 Use of the traditional district-
ing principles of contiguity, compactness, and respect for political 
subdivisions will, more likely than not, remove the districting 
plan from the suspect category. 
As much as possible, town, township, and precinct boundaries 
should be honored. Within towns, neighborhood subdivisions 
should be split only if absolutely necessary. Any failure to use 
traditional districting tools must have a sufficient, non-racial, 
justification or be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
interest. 161 
Third Recommendation: Reduce Political Influence 
It is apparently contrary to the basic laws of the political 
world to have redistricting conducted solely on a non-partisan 
basis, but the Shaw decision indirectly encourages it. It would be 
naive to assert that most judicial redistricting battles are fought 
for the purely altruistic reason of racial equality. They are fought 
because an interest group senses an opportunity to improve its 
position vis-a-vis its opponent. Twisting the VRA into serving 
purely political ends has turned out to be child's play. Though left 
156. See supra note 41. 
157. See supra note 46 and accompanying text for a discussion of "non-
retrogression. " 
158. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
159. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. 
160. See supra notes 105-22 and accompanying text. 
161. This is not to suggest that town officials should play ~'hide the ball" with 
the reasoning for districting decisions but that the justification behind every line 
drawn should be considered. 
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unstated, implications arise from Shaw that there are constitu-
tional limits to political gameplaying.162 
A reduction of political pressure to protect incumbents or 
"pair"163 political enemies would make the walk between the VRA 
strictures and the rules established in Shaw immeasurably eas- ' 
ier. Because political considerations have little to do with the con-
stitutionally-approved redistricting tools of contiguity, 
compactness, and community of interest, their removal will 
increase reliance on these traditional tools and on the VRA 
requirements alone. 164 In turn, this will reduce the cl~ances of 
creating a district which is so ridiculous that it can only be 
explained as racially motivated. 
Unrealistic though it may be, the best solution appears for a 
redistricting commission or committee to be established with 
membership equally divided among all political groups with a 
deciding member chosen by a coin flip or lottery. The commis'sion 
will be charged only with establishing procedures and districts for 
elections. For those counties where "non-partisan" elections are 
held, interest groups still develop and should be accounted for in 
organizing the commission.165 The deciding member could be "cho-
sen" on the same schedule as elections are held to ensure that no 
single political group unfairly retains control for too long. 
Also, to reduce political pressures, the county should engage 
an outside redistricting consultant who is provided only with 
"legitimate" data, such.- as population, township lines, neighbor-
hoods. Then, the consultant can develop the ideal model plan 
which, most likely, will be free from outside political pressure. 
This method has been approved of in recent cases.166 
162. See, e.g., Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, Ugly: An Inquiry Into the 
Problem of Racial Gerrymandering Under the Voting Rights Act, 92 MICH. L. 
REV. 652 (1993). 
163. "Pairing" is the process of placing two incumbents of the opposing party in 
the same district thereby reducing the number of incumbents from the opposing 
party. Grofman, supra note 48 at 1251. 
164. See, e.g., Joseph Neff and Rob Christiansen, Insider Tells of the Politics 
Behind Districts, THE NEWS AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), March 31, 1994, at 
1A. The political influence on North Carolina's challenged redistricting plan is 
illustrated by a list of the instructions given to the chief mapmaker for the 
General Assembly; none of them are related to race. Id. at 16A. 
165. In actuality, there is probably no such thing as a truly "non-partisan" 
election. The political animal generally travels in a pack. 
166. See, e.g., Emison v. Growe, 782 F. Supp. 427 (D. Minn. 1992); see also 
Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of 
Political Fairness, 71 TEX L. REV. 1643, 1696-1702 (1993) (describing the 
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CONCLUSION 
Just as local officials finally became comfortable about com-
plying with the requirements of the VRA, the Supreme Court has 
drawn a line on the extent of that Act. Local districting plans may 
now be challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
United States Constitution if "the legislation, though race-neutral 
on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other 
than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the 
basis ofrace."167 The precise measurement of "rationality" has not 
been established but certainly what is permissible under the VRA 
has been narrowed. 
The Court has taken a step towards a "color-blind" Constitu-
tion but has not held its hand out to help local officials follow. 
Trapped between the two great mountains of the VRA and the 
Shaw decision, local redistricters must follow a long and winding 
road in the dark and fog. This note may provide some temporary 
light to guide the way but the full revelation of where the 
Supreme Court is leading is yet to come. 
Charles W. McKeller 
difficulties and advantages of computer-modeling in reducing political influence 
on redistricting). 
167. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2828 (1993). 
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